Monday, April 7, 2014

Discussion: International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War

When asked whether the Soviet Union was forced out of the Cold War, Marshal Yazov, an anti-reformer in 1991, responded: “Absolutely…. We simply lacked the power to oppose the USA, England, Germany, France, Italy—all the flourishing states that were united in the NATO bloc….. We had to find an alternative to the arms race…. We had to continually negotiate, and reduce, reduce, reduce—especially the most expensive weaponry.”[1] Such an explanation does not immediately suggest a realist or liberal interpretation of the events that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Why did the Cold War end? A constructivist view suggests that Gorbachev influenced but did not control the outcome of the political and economic developments in the Soviet Union in the late-1980s, movements and concepts were influential beyond domestic groups and individual leaders, and realism, with its focus on the military-security dimension of state preferences, seems least able to explain the end of the Cold War. International relations perspectives are tools and their applicability is tied to the nature of the subject (e.g., the degree to which international structure, alliances, balances are dominant, or domestic political characteristics of states). This analysis will consider what insights realism, liberalism, individual actor, and constructivism bring to the events of the late-1980s; then it will consider in more detail how applicable the core concepts of realism are to understanding the end of the Cold War; and finally, it will suggest why the case of the end of the Cold War is an example for combining the perspectives in international relations.

Insights from realism, liberalism, individual actor, and constructivism about the end of the Cold War

Realism helps to explain the significance of the material pressures that limited the policy choices of Soviet leaders during the 1980s. Waltz discussed the possibilities of systems transformation. He highlighted that wars involving enough major powers may be system-transforming, and in a bipolar world, a major power may seek hegemony or may seek to expand the pool of major powers by engineering the “amalgamation” of several second-tier states.[2] Mearsheimer’s conception of anarchy means that states are caught in an inescapable security competition and in the struggle for power, states will not agree and cooperate in the construction of a peaceful world order.[3] But that is exactly what Gorbachev and Western leaders did in the case of the end of the Cold War. According to realism, a global shift in material structure precluded Soviet leaders from doing anything but scaling back their power and empire, so the ideational factors referred to by Soviet leaders at the time and by international relations researchers afterward were the results of material structure—the material pressures and incentives produced by material factors drove Soviet policy decision-making.[4] Interestingly, Brooks and Wohlforth did not entirely discount the impact of ideational factors, though they argued that “material incentives systematically undermined alternatives to retrenchment” within the Soviet sphere of power.[5] The focus of realism is mainly on existing structure—and in fact some of realism’s most powerful theoretical-analytical material explores static structure and not dynamic change and history—as in the work of Waltz and Mearsheimer.[6] Realism is well-equipped to handle material forces and the strategies for dealing with the economic problems faced by the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War cannot be usefully explained by “narrow calculations of relative power,” to use the words chosen by Mearsheimer to explain why powers do not work together to promote world order, when that is exactly what Gorbachev was trying to do by his own admission.[7] The end of the Cold War was one of the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century and since it happened fairly unexpectedly, the low premium realism places on changing power dynamics means it seems to miss a lot of important aspects of the historical evidence.

Liberalism can help explain how Gorbachev sought to manage and capitalize on domestic-political developments at home and in Eastern Europe. Most importantly, liberalism can help explain why the Cold War ended peacefully—there was no security threat-response dynamic activated by events in the 1980s. Gorbachev’s policies of political openness and economic restructuring opened the door to democratization trends, especially in Eastern Europe, and liberalism helps understand events with its economic interdependence argument that Gorbachev realized that collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European economies could only be avoided by building economic connections, opening economic relations with the West.[8] Liberalism—with its focus on domestic political systems, democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations—presents a strong, multi-causal explanation for the events leading up to 1989, a historical train of events that transformed the international-political system even though national security interests were still fully engaged (the Cold War was still going and the Soviet military was intact until 1991).[9] The liberal view of shifting state preferences helps explain Gorbachev’s interest in defusing the Cold War military rivalry. Moravcsik explained that the realist power balancing was only a temporary, propping up of the status quo: “Conclusion of the Cold War proceeded precisely as Kennan’s two-stage liberal model had predicted. Realist power balancing served throughout as a static, interim instrument to maintain the status quo, but shifting state preferences explain the outbreak and eventual passing of the conflict.”[10] Gorbachev saw political advantage in revoking the Brezhnev doctrine, responding to important changes in the domestic-political landscape in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, and thereby changing the political rules within the communist bloc—not as a response to any structural forces and Gorbachev seemed to be liberated by the new thinking rather than constrained by any systemic factors.[11] For liberalism, the Cold War ended the way it did because economic incentives and domestic political pressures for pluralism and political representation created political opportunities for leaders like Gorbachev to react to the demands of societal power groups and to represent new state preferences.

While liberalism focuses on the collapse of Eastern European socialism in 1989 as the radical change that Gorbachev was responding to, the individual actor perspective points to developments starting at least three years earlier. When the Cold War finally ended—recalling that for Thatcher it ended as early as 1988—the prevailing narrative marked the end of Eastern European socialism in 1989 as the decisive turning point, even though earlier events like Chernobyl in 1986 were instrumental in creating the new thinking that Gorbachev helped implement with new Soviet policies.[12] One of the most powerful explanations for the end of the Cold War to come from the individual actor perspective is that, beginning in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev and his circle of policy makers and analysts, collectively arrived at a coherent concept (worldview) that accepted the “mutuality of security in the nuclear age” and interdependence of states—and decided on a policy strategy aimed at avoiding the security dilemma at the heart of Cold War tensions.[13] Soviet thinking didn’t just acknowledge the international community but argued that the Soviet Union should be fully engaged in that “liberal international community”—a paradigmatic shift for communist leaders and a genuinely new national identity for the Soviet Union, which necessitated new formulations of national interests.[14] For the individual actor perspective, the Cold War ended the way it did because Gorbachev had transformed his ideas for the Soviet Union’s role in international politics and was able to enact enough policies to make that new national identity a political reality.

Constructivism links key changes in Soviet security conceptions to ideas and the political strategies suggested by those ideas. For constructivism, ideas can be causally significant in explaining important international-political changes. Risse-Kappen explained that Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev and the Western policy reactions that ratcheted down the Cold War, grew out of a set of “principled” ideas which were conceived of by “a transnational liberal internationalist community comprising the U.S. arms control community, Western European scholars and center-left policymakers, as well as Soviet institutchiks.”[15] Though realism may recognize that state identities react to the international-political structure, realism does not explain how states form their identities; constructivism helps by linking leaders’ ideas with the character of the state they represent.[16] Evangelista concluded that Gorbachev mobilized ideas from various policy sources to expand his political power, exercised power through his control of the domestic-political agenda and the political power associated with the top position in a hierarchical organization, to see the triumph of the ideas and values he believed in—a peaceful end to the Cold War.[17] For constructivism, ideas enable political strategies and the ideas that motivated Gorbachev and his intellectual peers allowed for the relaxing of military competition and engagement with the international economic system including Western economies.

How does one identify the most important insights? Realism, with its focus on international structure, is well-suited to highlight the material forces that shaped the strategies Soviet leaders had to consider for dealing with systemic economic problems relating to military spending and fiscal mismanagement—but factors of relative power with the United States and the West, in the traditional power sense, were not paramount in the events that ended the Cold War. For liberalism, the end of the Cold War resulted because economic incentives and domestic political pressures for political representation and reform create opportunities for leaders like Gorbachev to mobilize power by representing new state preferences. For the individual actor perspective, Gorbachev was intellectually open and capable enough to transform his ideas for the Soviet Union’s role in international politics and was able to enact enough policies to fashion a new national identity that rejected the East-West military-power conflict. For constructivism, ideas enabled the political strategies and the ideas that motivated Gorbachev and his intellectual peers allowed for the relaxation of military competition and engagement with the international economic system including Western economies. To understand the most important factor, Gorbachev was central or at least instrumental to all international relations interpretation but the realist one. Gorbachev was reacting to constituencies to maintain power, and absorbing new ideas about the Soviet Union’s relationship with the West and making them into a new Soviet national identity. While Gorbachev was important, most important were the ideas held by influential and politically active groups, organized transnationally.

Realist assumptions and insights into the end of the Cold War

The realist conception of anarchy might explain the end of the Cold War as the Soviet Union’s shrewd adjustment of means and ends to achieve its fundamental security interest in a hostile world. For realists, there is no escaping the “self-help” imperative that guides states in a hostile world. Though ends and means may change, without a hegemonic power to keep stability, a state must “search for the most appropriate means of obtaining security.”[18] By this interpretation, Gorbachev found the most appropriate solution to the Soviet Union security problem in economic liberalization. The liberal response to realist anarchy is that it is not so all-imposing. While conflict may exist, it is more the normal course of state affairs that interests can be integrated to the point that the effects of anarchy are mitigated, sources of conflict reduced, and means for increasing collective gains found.[19] Realist anarchy does not allow for such a powerful state as the Soviet Union to peacefully exit the anarchical organization of powers. Given realism’s concept of self-help, it is hard to explain the Soviet Union’s desire to improve its economic conditions by opening to the West given the overt military hostility between capitalist and communist blocs. Anarchy and its closely related concept of self-interest (narrowly defined) clash directly with the universalist and internationalist values Gorbachev was self-proclaiming.

For realism, the United States was responding to the Soviet Union’s capability to threaten the political independence and security of Western Europe during the Cold War, and both powers needed to rely on internal balancing against the other. For realists who focus on the international distribution of power, the United States could not ignore what appeared to be the Soviet Union’s ability to subjugate all of Europe, deemed a vital national interest by U.S. leaders, and therefore the United States had no choice but to counter Soviet power capabilities until the means of threatening the “other industrial centers of the world” no longer existed.[20] This realist conception of capabilities and balancing provided a likely scenario for how the Cold War would end. In a bipolar international system, each superpower had to rely on internal balancing, and if one superpower was more efficient than the other at harnessing national power for the competition, and the other was not able to match, because of the bipolar arrangement, there would be no option to bring a powerful alliance into play—the Soviet Union could not compete because it managed allies poorly and had economic management problems that precluded it from matching the economic output of the Unites States and the West.[21] Gorbachev’s actions did not conform to a realist interpretation. Instead of finding solutions to the problem of internal investment, finding ways to increase economic efficiency and execute internal balancing better, he opted to change the political terms of the Cold War power game with the ideas of international interdependence and transnational values. This argument highlights a central problem of realism: arguing that international structure causes state behavior is both descriptive and prescriptive, and therefore anomalous actions by leaders are inexplicable by realist theory alone.[22] U.S. leaders appeared to be responding to what they understood to be Soviet leaders’ intentions. Soviet hard power capabilities, still very evident in the 1980s as illustrated by the military occupation of Afghanistan, did not factor in as primary considerations for American foreign policy.

The realist concepts of power and power accumulation would suggest that the Cold War ended because the Soviet Union admitted a patent inability to defend itself against possible Western military action against it or its satellites. Soviet leaders were able to pursue a more ambitious—in hard power terms—foreign policy approach than the United States based on a willingness to fight (and therefore be continuously prepared militarily for) general war, because the Soviet Union was a statist power, not tamed in any way through dynamics of domestic politics.[23] Realism both recognizes the centrality of power and the general imperative that state aims must be trimmed to be in line with what the international-political system will allow—states may pursue the aims that are within the possibilities of the given system.[24] Gorbachev was not all-powerful, even though he was at the head of the Soviet political system. He had the power to deconstruct the Soviet system but not to entirely replace it.[25] By a realist conception of power, one would assume for the Cold War to end the Soviet Union would have to accept some kind of formal and explicit defeat. On the contrary, Gorbachev acted like he believed the new ideas he represented had won.

As with liberalism, realism assumes rational state behavior. For states to react to structural forces requires state leaders who understand security and the implications of anarchy, and this understanding must, for realism, be essentially uniform for state leaders across the system. Rationality is a fundamental assumption of realism; it cannot be violated for realism to work.[26] Assuming rationality is useful for explaining certain static elements like strategies, given preferences, and common knowledge, but does not appear as useful in explaining preference variation, and what strategies are available to choose from—variables that are needed to explain Gorbachev’s behavior in the mid- to late-1980s.[27] As has been argued by Legro and Moravcsik, rationality and its related concept of an anarchical international system, assumed to be uniform and constant, explain very little about how states arrive at different preferred outcomes, or define policy preferences.[28] A realist view of the Cold War international system does not explain how Gorbachev moved to downplay military competition ahead of the Western powers. It is also important to note that there was no direct causal chain between Western political demands and the demands that Gorbachev chose to place on the Soviet system and bloc.

How well does realism explain the end of the Cold War? Although realism may allow for a power to fall out of the major power system—history, of course, is full of fallen great powers—and out of the clutches of the anarchical system, it is much harder to understand how such a powerful actor as the Soviet Union could step down from major power conflict without war. Very different than realism would predict, U.S. leaders seemed more tuned to Soviet intentions than strict military-power capabilities. Though realism assumes Gorbachev could only win or lose the Cold War, it seemed he changed the rules of the game instead. A realist perspective does not explain Gorbachev’s determination to deemphasize the military competition with the West; to actively make the Soviet Union appear less militarily threatening and more like an economically viable partner. Realism is least effective at explaining the end of the Cold War because it offers no insights at the individual leader and bloc-political levels.

International relations interpretations of the end of the Cold War and the international relations field

The development of different international relations perspectives has led to distinct research camps that have sometimes competed with each other. The dominant theme of twentieth century international relations was the competition between the categories of realism and idealism (which has not entirely gone away). This duality has been at times accepted uncritically as almost a given, even if it is more accurately a “founding myth,” and many of the most prominent theoretical disputes have been defined using these terms.[29] The realism and idealism dichotomy reduces theoretical perspectives to a simple contrast between realists who value prudence, rationality, and the overriding logic of self-interest, and idealists who insist that there is a fundamental “harmony” of state interests, and that power can mix with altruism.[30] Mearsheimer may be correct that realism has dominated international relations discourse since Machiavelli.[31] The question is if this is good for international relations theory and research, or does having one very dominant, paradigmatic approach hurt the field? Does it help the field to have such a dominant tradition, especially if it is the least capable of explaining the end of the Cold War? The problem lies in the hostility expressed at times between the perspectives. The characterization that liberalism is an “anti-realist ideology” is simply not analytically helpful, and the characterization that realism causes war, costly arms races, and “secret” diplomacy, at odds with democracy and economic prosperity, is hard to take seriously.[32] Realism charges that liberalism is essentially utopian—even though the connection is not so compelling—because of the naive belief that democratic peace counteracts anarchy and removes cause for war above the level of states.[33] A dichotomy between rationalist and sociological—i.e., constructivist—theory has also been identified. Some writers seem to want to perpetuate the duality between realism and structuralism even though a blending of the two might produce fruitful research opportunities.[34] Simplistic dichotomies between research approaches have exasperated theoretical divides and disputes between international relations theorists.

Parallel to the development of different international relations perspectives has been the ongoing tension between efforts to establish international relations theory as a social science and efforts to distance international relations theory from social scientific tools. International relations theory in America has become more methodologically rigorous over the last several decades.[35] International relations theory attempted to embrace “hard” sciences at around the same time the hard sciences were adopting such “soft” science concepts as “indeterminacy, irregularity, and unpredictability”—a situation John Lewis Gaddis referred to vividly as two ships passing in the night.[36] There have also been attempts to unseat realism in international relations theory by attacking its positivistic and rationalistic foundations. There was a “critical movement” committed to restoring “the historical, the particular and the contingent” in the study of international politics by returning self-regarding agents to the core of the field.[37] While perhaps understandable given the predictive power of the hard sciences, and given that social scientific tools may continue to strengthen quantitative aspects of international politics research, the field of international relations theory could learn from newer scientific methodologies that embrace post-positivist concepts. To the extent that international relations theory deals with international politics, the field should try to recapture its historical emphasis on human agency.

The desire for parsimony and predictive power expressed so succinctly by Waltz in Theory of International Politics—and a fixation on scientific methods by some in the international relations field—seems fueled at least in part by a desire for policy relevance and influence in Washington circles. There have been attempts to establish international relations as an objective science on the grounds that international politics itself is based on instrumental rationality, and that by removing values and raising instrumental calculations to a universal level, both theorists and practitioners can calculate, if not predict, the actions and reactions of actors. Williams wrote in 1993: “This form of action, once understood, is applicable to all times and in all places, and thus allows international relations to be subsumed under, and comprehended within, the framework of a positivistic science.”[38] There has been a long tradition of applying mechanistic concepts, models, and analogies to international relations theory, especially in concepts of balance of power and systems analysis.[39] Critics of attempts to establish international relations as a positivistic science argue that the epistemological ideal of parsimony is misguided, and that preoccupation with social scientific methods draws the attention of theorists and research away from the “actual international game.”[40] It might be more useful to think of international relations as a field that draws from history, sociology, psychology, and economics, but not as an independent discipline—a full-blown social science.[41] International politics as human activity based on such things as bargaining dynamics seems to suggest only limited roles for scientific methods. Social scientific tools may be applicable for some analysis (testing theories) but not for using theories.

Historical continuity suggests that international relations events are the product of both structural forces and the impact of particular leaders at the time.[42] The end of the Cold War which set the stage for the continuing economic globalization and wars of the 1990s, and transnational terrorism of the early twenty-first century, was the result of both systemic economic tides turning against the Soviet Union and the ideas and human agency of Gorbachev (and other key leaders). The impact of individual actors cannot be overlooked. Gorbachev’s tactics combined creative ideology with an unusual (for Soviet politics) diffusion of authority, and this is most important for understanding how the Cold War ended peacefully.[43] Risse-Kappen concluded that to understand the “sea change in world politics” brought about by the end of the Cold War requires the conceptual power of combining structural, domestic-political, and ideational models.[44] Using bargaining theory as an analogy, Moravcsik explained well the sense of combining international relations approaches to arrive at “synthetic” explanations for behavior and outcomes.[45] International relations theory should combine the perspectives to arrive at richer, synthetic explanations for state preferences and behavior. Objective relationships between different states in an international system, the power groups that define a large part of states’ foreign policies, individual leaders, and powerful ideas all make up international politics and should be given due attention.

How does one arrive at the most useful approach? Simplistic dichotomies between research approaches have exasperated theoretical divides and disputes between international relations theorists. While perhaps understandable given the predictive power of the hard sciences, and given that social scientific tools may continue to strengthen quantitative aspects of international politics, the field of international relations theory could learn from newer scientific methodologies that embrace post-positivist concepts. International politics as human activity seems to suggest only limited roles for social scientific methods, as tools for some analysis (testing theories) but not for using theories (which requires human intuition and judgment). International relations theory should combine the perspectives to arrive at richer, synthetic explanations for state behavior. International relations theory will probably always tend toward analytical sterility as long as it is allowed to be dominated by an overly-powerful, single paradigmatic approach. It might be useful to look at international relations perspectives as layers of the same phenomenon. Ideas influence behavior of individual leaders and actors; individuals influence groups and movements; groups and movements influence political processes; political processes are reacting to international-political factors as multiple states act and react.

Conclusion

To understand the most important factor, Gorbachev was central or at least instrumental to all international relations interpretation but realism. Gorbachev was both reacting to constituencies to maintain power, and taking new ideas about the Soviet Union’s relationship with the West and making them into a new Soviet national identity. Realism is least effective at explaining the end of the Cold War at the individual leader and bloc-political levels. International relations theory will probably always tend toward sterility as long as it is allowed to be dominated by an overly-powerful single paradigm. The end of the Cold War can best be understood as the result of Gorbachev’s aims, the domestic-political forces at work in Eastern European socialist states, and the global economic trends that made centralized state-planned economies less and less efficient.

It is interesting that realism, which focuses so exclusively on great powers, should so underrate the impact of leaders of great powers, but that is exactly what Mearsheimer does.[46] Powerful ideas changed, if only briefly, the norms governing great power politics between the Soviet Union and the United States just long enough for Gorbachev to enact political changes at home and kick start political reform in Eastern Europe—political changes significant enough to reinforce American views that the Cold War was moribund.


Notes

1. Quoted in Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000–2001): 46.

2. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 199.

3. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 49–50.

4. Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,” 7–8.

5. Ibid., 50.

6. R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” International Studies Quarterly 31, no. 1 (1987): 70.

7. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 49.

8. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 31–32.

9. Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 547.

10. Ibid., 546–547.

11. Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 228.

12. Robert English, “The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity Change, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (2005): 78.

13. Janice Gross Stein, “Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner,” in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 10.

14. English, “The Sociology of New Thinking,” 74.

15. Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization 48, no. 2 (1994): 212–213.

16. See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Organization 57, no. 1 (2003): 104.

17. Matthew Evangelista, “Turning Points in Arms Control,” in Ending the Cold War: Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations, eds. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 103.

18. Brian Ripley, “Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory,” Political Psychology 14, no. 3 (1993): 409.

19. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 45.

20. Mark L. Haas, “The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?” International Organization 61, no. 1 (2007): 150.

21. Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 190.

22. Robert Jervis, Systemic Theories: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 118.

23. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, no. 3 (2000–2001): 143.

24. Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 986.

25. Jack Snyder, “The Domestic Political Logic of Gorbachev’s New Thinking in Foreign Policy,” International Politics 48, no. 4–5 (2011): 565.

26. Ripley, “Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory,” 408.

27. Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 682.

28. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24, no. 2, (1999): 20.

29. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” 69.

30. Legro and Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” 54.

31. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 369.

32. Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Two Concepts of Liberty: U.S. Cold War Grand Strategies and the Liberal Tradition,” International Security 37, no. 2 (2012): 11.

33. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 8.

34. Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory: A Scientific Assessment,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 45 (page number from proof).

35. G. John Ikenberry, “Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition,” International Studies 46, no. 1–2 (2009): 205.

36. John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992–1993): 53–54.

37. Michael C. Williams, “Neo-Realism and the Future of Strategy,” Review of International Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 120.

38. Ibid., 108.

39. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political Theory,” 74.

40. Koslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change in International Politics,” 222.

41. Fred Halliday, “International Relations Theory and the Post-Cold War Period,” METU Studies in Development 27, no. 3–4 (2000): 259.

42. Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 249.

43. Snyder, “The Domestic Political Logic,” 563-564.

44. Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely,” 213.

45. Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory,” 42.

46. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 369.

Thursday, January 23, 2014

Discussion: Economic Globalization and its Consequences

Some researchers see globalization as hundreds of years old while others see it as only decades old. If globalization is equated with “internationalization” then it certainly appears to be nothing new at all.[1] This has to do with whether one is looking at political, social, or economic globalization. The narrower concept of economic globalization was an outgrowth of economic challenges that threatened to swamp advanced Western economies in the 1970s and early 1980s. This analysis will look at how and why economic globalization—trade and market liberalization—was promoted after the 1970s, by what organizations, and what the intended and unintended consequences of economic globalization on state and society were. It will also present some competing interpretations of globalization. Economic globalization was promoted after the 1970s through an aggressive agenda of structural adjustments meant to open national and subnational markets to international competition. The agenda was pushed on many developing countries that were already facing crushing debt and stagnant growth.

Like the terms state and class, the term globalization has been used in very different ways. For some sociologists, globalization (or structural globalization) refers to the “density” of interactions between states as compared to local and national levels.[2] For other authors, globalization broadly speaking refers to the increase in integration of states into a global economic framework.[3] For Jonathan Friedman, globalization does not necessarily mean anything more than the integration of world markets.[4] Economic globalization, as economic liberalization, refers to the process of removing official barriers, such as trade barriers, foreign exchange restrictions, and capital controls, to the movement of resources between states to create a borderless market economy.[5] The transfer of many liberal economic practices associated with the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other advanced economies to parts of the developing world had profound consequences for the governments and populations in many parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Economic globalization, which began in the late 1970s as a reaction to stagnant growth in parts of the world, forced increased integration by spreading economic liberalization policies that linked national economies in new ways. The current era of emphasizing free market economic policies can be dated to the late-1970s, before that, most Western economies followed Keynesian policies associated with the post-World War Two era.[6] The change in economic ideology can be traced to the 1970s oil crisis and economic slowdown, followed by the global debt crisis of the 1980s.[7] Economic globalization may be thought of as the globalization of capital (the loosening of commodity and labor markets have lagged far behind financial market liberalization).

Economic globalization was aggressively promoted after the 1970s based on the belief that some developing economies had stagnated behind protectionist barriers. From 1973 (the oil crisis) until 1998 real global GDP grew annually at a rate of 3 percent, down from 4.9 percent in the period 1950-1973, and over the same period since 1973, growth in Africa dropped 38 percent and in Latin America the decrease was 43 percent.[8] At least initially, economic globalization and the Washington Consensus were promoted in response to the sluggish Latin American economies of the 1980s, which saw contracting GNP due to counterproductive public policies, high budget deficits, and bloated state sector subsidies.[9] Many of the economic liberalization recommendations could be characterized as “instantaneous” market adjustments.[10]

There were major players behind the post-1970s globalization effort who were pursuing specific economic interests, primarily trying to get underperforming developing economies to expand and repay loans. The Washington Consensus was a project that included many actors including the IMF, the World Bank, the advanced Western economies, the United States Executive Branch, and like-minded members of the U.S. Congress, among others. One of the strongest motivations for the IMF in economic globalization was to aggressively combat inflation which was seen as both “costly” and prone to spiral out of control if it got too high.[11] Powerful Western economies including the United States and United Kingdom played a dominant role in setting the rules of international economic activity and directing the process of economic globalization.[12] The power of states like the U.S. and United Kingdom to impose practices on other states was based on Anglo-American traditions and laws—the U.S. imposed standards on other states as a hegemonic power.[13] Increasingly multinational corporations in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan reversed their previous opposition to liberalization and lobbied for more open international markets, in the interest of their own market expansion.[14] This process, driven by U.S. and British commercial interests, was closely associated with the conservative Reagan and Thatcher administrations.

The Washington Consensus began as a series of economic recommendations, including fiscal discipline, tax reform, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, and removal of barriers to foreign investment, to spur growth and control inflation in newly industrialized economies as well as ailing mature economies. Even though the Washington Consensus aimed to promote development and growth by focusing on liberalization of trade and investment regimes, deregulation of domestic markets, and privatization of public enterprises, it led to various major economic shocks which created a degree of backlash by 1999 and 2000. Some researchers have called the Washington Consensus a hegemonic, neoliberal, ideologically-driven agenda that “proclaims marketization and privatization as solutions to the world’s problems.”[15]

The intended consequences of economic globalization, as codified in the Washington Consensus, were domestic liberalization, free market orientation, and conservative macroeconomic policies. Still, some saw the economic recommendations of the Washington Consensus as a veiled democracy promotion agenda. By increasing the mobility of global capital and removing protectionist barriers, states would be in a position to maximize their natural resources and labor capabilities through competition. The theory behind neoliberal economic globalization projected that through competition and open markets, states would specialize in a global market by exploiting their comparative advantage and thus maximize growth through increased trade.[16] Financial markets, as opposed to commodity and labor markets, responded dramatically to liberalization: in 1980, total cross-border transactions of the advanced economies was still below 10 percent of their GDP, but by 1995, the total had surpassed 100 percent.[17]

There were unintended consequences as well which proved that globalization could be especially disruptive at the national and subnational levels. According to Sassen, globalization did not directly challenge territoriality but it was transforming the “exclusive territoriality of the nation state”—there were real effects of economic globalization on nation-state sovereignty.[18] It has been argued by some that economic liberalization contributed to a string of currency crises, stock market collapses, and financial panics in the 1990s.[19] The research of Li and Reuveny found that reduced trade barriers and portfolio investment inflows could negatively impact democracy, and foreign direct investment positively impacted democracy but the effects lessened over time.[20] Economic globalization may hurt democracy because states that compete actively for foreign investment may shape policies that attract global corporations but counter the interests of their populations (and the situation is worse if the governments are not answerable to the people through elections).[21] As capital was freed to move more freely across national borders, corporations became more unstable and exhibited increasing turnovers in management, especially as corporations were bought and sold more regularly—this process was most on view during the hostile takeover trend of the 1980s. Economic globalization apparently hurt labor interests. Workers had difficulty competing with multinational corporations employing global business strategies, and many governments in developing states had more of an incentive to cater to multinational corporation wishes (to win lucrative foreign direct investment) than the interests of their own citizens.[22] Although it is unclear if this was really unintended, the competition for foreign investment drove many governments to abruptly and dramatically change the social contract between policymakers and the governed. Social safety nets were scrapped or vastly reduced, economic hardships generally increased for the poor, and many forms of social protection like gender discrimination policies and environmental protection policies were tossed aside as “barriers” to economic growth.

The consequences of economic globalization including the Washington Consensus period and the post-Washington Consensus period were many and it appears that in many ways the changes to the state, interstate relations, and global markets are still playing themselves out. It should be pointed out that the effects of trade conflicts and financial instability are correspondingly worse on smaller, open, lower-income states which are adhering to the principles of economic liberalization.[23] In general, economic globalization increased the pace of change for populations in many different states in both advanced economies, such as in Europe and parts of East Asia, and developing economies, and in the process of expanding international economic interaction, there appeared to be some “homogenization” of culture. Still, dramatically different social and political systems remain in the world, as well as different economic systems, so it is possible that local and national political systems are stronger at managing external influences than was thought before.[24] As Sassen argued, one of the roles of the modern state in today’s global economy is to mediate between national law and foreign interests, meaning firms, markets, or “supranational organizations.”[25] It is still too early to declare that globalization spelled the end of the modern state.

There are competing views on globalization and economic globalization. Many states up until the 1970s used economic barriers to protect indigenous markets from international competition. For Robinson, economic globalization significantly restructured the international labor systems, reorganized national production systems, seriously altered the internal social and political makeup of states, and eroded national boundaries and promoted social uniformity (presumably a bad thing).[26] Wallerstein would argue that the globalization of capital is nothing but another attempt by some in the capitalist classes to maximize profits—since their markets have evolved to the point that barriers no long help their interests—in the global economy.[27] Scholte advocated a definition of globalization as a respatialization of social life, emphasizing the advent of supraterritorial connectivity, and downplaying the economic dimension of globalization.[28] Financial integration is not new since there was at least two centuries of this based in Europe before the 1980s, but of course the degree to which financial integration grew and penetrated nation-states under the Washington Consensus was unprecedented. There are reasons to see the globalization of the late-twentieth century as not entirely new, but it does appear that this most recent wave of globalization created much deeper levels of global interconnectedness.

Many questions about economic globalization remain to be explored. Does economic globalization undermine the state or strengthen the state? According to Shaw, globalization of the second half of the twentieth century has seen the decline in the power of the state, not because of economic integration, but because of “nation-states’ own projections of military power.”[29] Prima facie it would seem that economic globalization would undermine the state by weakening territorial sovereignty and weakening political sovereignty by expecting national policymakers to adjust and implement policies from outside bodies, and weakening the concept of state citizenship. Scholte is probably premature in calling the current period an end of territorialism, though it would seem reasonable that current concepts of national-territorialism are changing.[30] Instead, it appears that states—as they undergo the pressures of outside competition—are changing by emphasizing different aspects of state sovereignty. To stay relevant in the field of governance, states that have undergone the economic globalization transformation successfully have become more nimble and better able to respond to the needs of their citizens because they have been forced to adapt. One possible unforeseen effect of economic globalization based on market liberalization is that states appear to recover from financial disasters quicker than pre-1970s.[31] It is also not clear that multinational corporations today—that really operate in many different countries—can really be compared to multinational corporations of the pre-1945 era, for example.

Economic globalization is a concept that has sparked intense debate—not least for its close association with the controversial policies of the so-called Washington Consensus—but at the same time, growing interconnectedness across the world of ideas, programs, and policies is hard to deny. What is unclear is whether economic globalization will wind up more harmful than good. For now, states appear to be transforming to operate more effectively in the new environment.


Notes

1. Jan Aart Scholte, “What is Globalization? The Definitional Issue-Again,” CSGR Working Paper No. 109/02, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), 26 February 2009, 9.

2. Christopher Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, and Benjamin D. Brewer, “Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System,” American Sociological Review 65, no. 1 (February 2000): 78.

3. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis,” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 29.

4. Jonathan Friedman, “Globalization: Dis-Integration, Re-Organization,” in Globalization, the State, and Violence, ed. Jonathan Friedman (Walnut Creek, CA: Rowman Altamira, 2003), 6.

5. Scholte, “What is Globalization?” 10.

6. Seeraj Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement: Changes in the Global Economy from the Golden Age to the Neoliberal Era, Global Labour University Working Papers, Paper no. 1 (Berlin, Germany: Global Labour University, February 2008), 1.

7. Ibid., 12.

8. Ibid., 3.

9. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus,” Revista de Economia Politica 19, no. 1 (73) (January-March 1999): 96.

10. See Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement, 2.

11. Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals,” 14.

12. Gao Shangquan, “Economic Globalization: Trends, Risks and Risk Prevention,” CDP Background Paper no. 1, Committee for Development Policy, 2000, 3.

13. Saskia Sassen, “The State and Globalization,” in Readings in Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas, ed. Mark Kesselman, 2nd ed. (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010), 91.

14. Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement, 12.

15. Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer, “Trade Globalization since 1795,” 77.

16. Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement, 22.

17. Shangquan, “Economic Globalization,” 2.

18. Sassen, “The State and Globalization,” 92.

19. Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement, 20.

20. Li and Reuveny, “Economic Globalization and Democracy,” 30.

21. Ibid., 36.

22. Mohamed, Economic Policy, Globalization and the Labour Movement, 6.

23. Michael D. Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, and Douglas A. Irwin, “Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?” NBER Working Paper no. 7195, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1999, 58.

24. David Brady, Jason Beckfield, and Wei Zhao, “The Consequences of Economic Globalization for Affluent Democracies,” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (August 2007): 327.

25. Sassen, “The State and Globalization,” 90.

26. William I. Robinson, “Globalization, the World System, and ‘Democracy Promotion’ in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Theory and Society 25, no. 5 (October 1996): 633.

27. Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 16, no. 4 (September 1974): 402.

28. Scholte, “What is Globalization?” 33.

29. Martin Shaw, “The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation,” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 500.

30. Scholte, “What is Globalization?” 22.

31. See Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin, “Is Globalization Today Really Different,” 5.


Addendum

1. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism," Review of International Political Economy 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 541-564.

Discussion: Development of the Modern State in Western Europe

In 1943, Franz Mueller suggested a definition of the state as made up of “expert officials” (or bureaucrats), based on rational laws, and enjoying an unchallenged monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined borders of a territory.[1] Many definitions of the state have been advanced but Mueller’s is still valid after seven decades. How did the modern state develop in Western Europe and how was the modern state model transferred to other parts of world? What is meant by “modern state”—as distinct from ancient and medieval concepts of the state—developed sometime between 1100 and 1600 in Europe due to the interaction of multiple patterns of resource accumulation, competition, security, and power alliances.

There are three dominant comparative politics research approaches: rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist. Each of the three schools—ideal-type research approaches—may engage in some cross-boundary interaction, but each is mostly concerned with advocating a particular intellectual world-view and championing an underlying intellectual tradition.[2] For rationalists, larger units like states are not significant beyond the group of individuals that make up the larger unit, and all explanations of behavior and decision-making and social change can only be understood in terms of individual decision-making based on the concept of rational choice.[3] For rationalists, the state reflects a society made up of individuals pursuing their interests according to rational criteria given the information available. For rationalists, the state developed to enhance the pursuit of power and wealth by individuals.

Both the rationalist and structuralist viewpoints are concerned with material interests. Structuralists interpret entities only in relation to other entities that are part of the same system—they are concerned with relationships among individuals, institutions, and organizations—so when looking at the state and society, they are concerned with the social, political, and economic interactions and relationships between members of the larger whole.[4] Structuralists, unlike rationalists, do not reduce explanations of social phenomenon to the individual level.[5] According to Lichbach, structuralists are like culturalists only in the sense that they take large organizations as a whole, and not as collections of individuals.[6] Because structuralists focus on institutions, they tend to view the state as having developed from groups allying with each other against other groups to pursue interests and power. Outside groups progressively gain power and representation in the center by allying with center groups. From a structuralist point of view, groups with power will sustain the state in order to both protect and expand their power.

The rationalists view culture functionally, as “expressive material” to reinforce the power of individuals.[7] In contrast, culturalists approach state and society in a methodologically holistic way, to borrow Lichbach’s idea, and perceive culture as permeating social organizations; culture imparts insider knowledge to members and culture is also the basis of social control.[8] States are “exogenously constructed,” including actors who are less independent agents than “actors of scripts.”[9] According to the culturalist school, the state reflects cultural norms and values, but culture is also dynamic. States and societies follow cultural rules not clearly known or understood by outsiders.[10] When it comes to the study of comparative politics, rationalists focus on the individuals using rational choice to serve their interests, structuralists focus on the institutional and other group relationships that make up the larger community, and culturalists focus on the insider rules that govern group identity.[11]

There are different conceptions of the state but functionalist definitions are most common. From the Weberian tradition, the state claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Territoriality is an aspect of the modern state: set and enforceable boundaries. The modern state exercises sovereignty and state sovereignty is a form depersonalized power—it developed as a distinct concept from ruler and ruled. The modern Western state exercises its sovereignty through laws (rational laws as opposed to divine laws) and the state itself is a legal entity.[12] The concept of sovereignty is translated into power through natural laws. The modern Western state imposes law and order over defined territory.

The modern state represents an impersonal power because while it developed to enhance the effectiveness of centralized rulers, over time it developed its own power through its ability to redistribute goods and services, and provide security independent of the rulers. Moreover, the more absolute the power of any ruler became, as states developed in Europe, the more the ruler became dependent on larger and larger bureaucratic entities to oversee military, economic, and legal affairs, and “transmit” the will of the ruler over the population—and over time, these bureaucracies—the state—became powerful in their own right and tended to seize power from the ruler.[13] The modern state was similar to medieval and ancient conceptions in that it was made up of a complex pattern of political, social, and ideological factors, but it was unique because it merged the abstract concept of the state with the “doctrine” of popular sovereignty independent of any individual ruler (who exercised royal sovereignty); the modern state is so powerful because it combines physical structure (institutions and bureaucracy) with conceptual structure (primarily based on rational-legal foundations).[14] Critical to any understanding of the modern state is bureaucracy. The term bureaucracy may be applied to the “servants and functionaries” who tended the military, fiscal, and legal affairs of some powerful individual like a king, emperor, or pope.[15] According to Tilly, market economies and “monetized agriculture” contributed to the development of industrial capitalism and the modern bureaucratic state.[16] Tilly’s theory of European state formation as a monopoly over the means of violence within a specified territory defined by boundaries is indebted to Weber and can be summarized as: war leads to need for extraction of resources which leads to repression which spurs state-building, since efficient extraction and efficient repression require centralized planning and coordination.[17] The modern state is the product of the competition between society, and the “natural rights” enjoyed by all members of the society, and the state, which enjoyed absolute sovereignty based on the common interests of all but requiring the management by a centralized power (a ruler).[18] Many different processes contributed to the development of the modern state including military organization and effectiveness, taxation, technical services, policing, control of food supplies, and manufacturing.[19] There is an important link between expanding economic activity, accumulation of wealth (resources), improved taxation ability, rising taxation, and rising expectations for representation in the taxation process.[20]

Key to the development of the modern state in Britain and France was rise of a capitalist class. Through the extraction of key political resources (means of power) and distribution of resources, such as for war, within a defined territory helped consolidate and centralize power (through the needs for centralized planning and individuals to operate such extractive activities, or bureaucrats). Such centralization and consolidation of power gave the territory and its dominant political unit—the state—a strength and durability significantly more than other kinds of organization like clan or tribe. The war-making activities of powerful classes required the extraction of taxes from the peasantry to pay for armies and administration, and as competition between early states increased, states employed various coercive and violent means to consolidate and protect power from lower classes. Whenever power in the center failed to protect itself from challenges around the periphery, deals were usually made to expand the center and expand representation in the center. Durable states will tend to develop where there is commercial activity (to tax) and where powerful classes may carry out ongoing extractive activities. Britain was a strong state with a weak “central bureaucratic” core, whereas France was strong bureaucratically but went through periods of being a weak state.[21] The British state usually fared well in paying for a military (though usually small) and carrying out taxation, but the state developed differently in in different parts of Europe depending on local conditions and the particular compromises arrived at by rulers and social classes.

Britain was a sea-based state which meant its rulers looked to urban classes for resources and power, whereas France was a land-based state which meant its rulers looked to the landed aristocracy for resources and power. The modern French state up through the seventeenth century was both centralized and decentralized, patrimonial and “professionalized,” financially strapped but still able to mobilize enough resources when crises arose.[22] France faced two problems which put it at a disadvantage as compared to Britain: a large number of tax exemptions placed the highest tax burden on “surplus-producing” peasants and tradesmen, which limited the amount the state could extract, and the French economy produced much less per capita surplus that was taxable as in Britain, which meant the French crown was often in debt.[23] Taxation systems in early modern states were the result of constant bargaining between powerful rulers who wanted resources to pay for war and expansion, and peasants and commercial classes that wanted protection (and later representation, when basic living needs were regularly met). The early modern British state had greater ability to mobilize resources but less “infrastructural power” than France, whereas France was the opposite, having difficulty extracting resources but more powerful control over the population, and its state authority was more pronounced along the peripheries.[24] Both Britain and France had an advantage in creating homogenous cultural populations by expulsions or conversions.[25] The Western European state was progressively centralized as monarchs became increasingly absolutist which required the progressive domination of previously independent groups including townsfolk, guilds, magistrates, “and, most importantly, the system of estates.”[26] Britain followed a relatively smooth transition to modern statehood but the move in France was more sporadic and linked to waves of rebellion.

Early modern states developed in Western Europe due to economic conditions. Modern states will not normally develop where there is an absence of free flowing and excess capital, and therefore no middle class. The Renaissance state was based on the merger of legal and religious authority “in sovereignty,” sovereignty exercised through bureaucracy, and once modern institutional bureaucratic method had replaced ‘royal household’ methods.[27] What is referred to today as the modern state—in the Western European sense—is the product of a long-term process of landed upper classes consolidating power through taxation and other coercive means, growing and fielding armies to ensure further taxation, suppressing popular rebellions, and forming beneficial alliances. In the state-formation process, some of the most important alliances were those between the royal rulers and the economic classes (which could be tapped for resources), and between royal rulers and nobility (those able to enforce and extend royal power). As centralized power grew in resources and capabilities there were challenges from outside the center and demands for greater representation. The Western European modern state model survived where other organizations like feudalism, multinational empires, and theocratic federations did not (or did not thrive).[28] A powerful church in the European context may have helped state formation by providing trained administrators, and by contributing to workable systems of law and large-scale organization.[29] The modern state developed in Western Europe as an especially effective social organization that could influence the creation, accumulation, and redistribution of wealth, concentrate power for military activities, offer representation to various internal groups, maintain order, and provide security.

Early-forming states primarily from Western Europe (colonizers) exported the modern state model to late-forming states (colonized territories) for reasons including control and exploitation. Creating modern states in colonized regions facilitated colonial control because state-to-state interaction was efficient. Modern state structures also facilitated the extraction of colonial resources. The new states were created by imposing state structures from the top-down; they did not resemble the early modern European states like Britain and France. The European states like Britain and France grew and consolidated power primarily through competition—at times very intense and violent—with one another. New states developed out of and reacted to very different circumstances given the forces of colonization.

In the first half-century after 1945, the number of states worldwide more than tripled. Western colonial powers tried to impose a modern state structure (according to Western political and economic norms) onto other populations with little success. Exportation of the Western state model has been only moderately successful in Latin America where many states have been unable to “put all of their people under the rule of law, nor establish firm civilian control over the military and the police, nor discover a durable balance between order and freedom,” and sovereignty in many parts of the region is especially weak.[30] In addition to active export in the form of colonization, there was also a process of “deliberate borrowing” by other sovereigns in Europe after observing the success of power consolidation and administration in France—a model for others to follow—not just the motivation to emulate to reap the same rewards but also to survive in competition (i.e., copy the competition in the hopes of surviving in competition).[31] Borrowing happened outside of Europe as well. In the nineteenth century, Japan deliberately copied successful Western state forms.[32] The transfer of the modern state to parts of Asia has been quite successful where it was able to build on ethnic homogeneity, literate elites, and—as in the case of Japan—strong local governance.[33]

The early development of the modern state in Europe was not mono-causal and did not proceed smoothly in all cases or in a linear process. But its development was helped greatly by the efficient control mechanisms a separate bureaucracy could bring to the social interactions of various classes in society. Lichbach recommended that comparativists should understand and appreciate the structure-culturalist-structuralist ideas, interests, and identities.[34] This analysis of the evolution of the modern state has relied primarily of a structuralist lens based on material factors and group relationships. Individual rulers and leaders are present but more important to this interpretation are the roles of bureaucrats, commercial groups, and peasants.


Notes

1. Franz H. Mueller, “The Development of the Modern Dualism between State and Society,” The American Catholic Sociological Review 4, no. 4 (December 1943): 189.

2. Mark I. Lichbach, “Social Theory and Comparative Politics,” in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, eds. Mark I. Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 241.

3. Ibid., 245-246.

4. Ibid., 247.

5. Ibid., 248.

6. Ibid., 247.

7. John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez, “World Society and the Nation‐State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 (July 1997): 149.

8. Lichbach, “Social Theory,” 246.

9. Meyer et al., “World Society,” 150.

10. See John W. Meyer and Ronald L. Jepperson, “The ‘Actors’ of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency,” Sociological Theory 18, no. 1 (March 2000): 100-120.

11. Lichbach, “Social Theory,” 249.

12. Brian R. Nelson, Making of the Modern State: A Theoretical Evolution (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 19.

13. Martin Van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State (Port Chester, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 125.

14. Nelson, Making of the Modern State, 138.

15. Tom Burns, “Sovereignty, Interests and Bureaucracy in the Modern State,” The British Journal of Sociology 31, no. 4 (December 1980): 491.

16. Peter H. Merkl, “Review: The Study of European Political Development,” World Politics 29, no. 3 (April 1977): 471.

17. Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review 10, no. 1 (March 2008), 29.

18. Burns, “Sovereignty, Interests and Bureaucracy,” 493.

19. Merkl, “Review: The Study of European Political Development,” 463.

20. Ibid., 465.

21. George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer, “The Expansion of the State,” Annual Review of Sociology 10 (August 1984): 463.

22. Samuel Clark, State and Status: The Rise of the State and Aristocratic Power in Western Europe (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), 51.

23. Ibid., 50.

24. Ibid., 134.

25. See Thomas and Meyer, “Expansion of the State,” 470.

26. Nelson, Making of the Modern State, 92.

27. Burns, “Sovereignty, Interests and Bureaucracy,” 492.

28. Merkl, “Review: The Study of European Political Development,” 464.

29. Ibid., 467.

30. Van Creveld, Rise and Decline, 314.

31. See J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 567.

32. Meyer et al., “World Society,” 164.

33. Van Creveld, Rise and Decline, 332.

34. Lichbach, “Social Theory,” 241.

Sunday, January 12, 2014

Discussion: Bismarck’s Realpolitik, Wilson’s Collective Security, and Some Critiques

Hans Morgenthau wrote that rational foreign policy is good foreign policy because it maximizes potential gains and minimizes potential risks, thereby achieving standards of moral prudence and functionality (or it produces the greatest amount of success in political terms at the lowest cost).[1] Both Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of collective security and Bismarck’s concepts of Realpolitik made claims to being good policy though they differed significantly. This analysis will review the merits and failings of each, and consider some critiques of both foreign policy approaches. Both are tools which may be appropriate in given geopolitical circumstances and if applied smartly.

Bismarck’s Realpolitik was based on a narrow definition of power and on a relative appreciation of interests. Morgenthau’s political realism helps illustrate Bismarck’s Realpolitik. For Morgenthau, political realism was based on fundamental checks and balances in international relations, it appealed to the world as evidenced in historical examples, and it accepted less-than-ideal results for the sake of systemic stability.[2] Bismarck’s Realpolitik can also be understood as an expression of Morgenthau’s central idea that political realism is interest defined as power. Unlike Metternich’s view of balance of power, Bismarck believed international relations were based on “raw power” and that stronger states will impose their will on weaker ones.[3] Bismarck upset the accepted international relations system based on a “unity of crowned heads”—he accepted a balance of power but such balance would be imposed by the strongest statesman—his concept of Realpolitik was based on an unrestrained contest of wills.[4] The salient characteristics of Bismarck’s Realpolitik included an impassioned assessment of national interests, a focus on tangible expressions of power, and adherence to a relativistic calculation of competing interests in the international order.

Bismarck’s Realpolitik was carefully considered and could be flexible. Bismarck meant to take action only after diplomatic groundwork had been laid and thus promoted a certain degree of systemic stability.[5] Bismarck was sure to “downplay” overt expressions of German power and instead used alliances to sufficiently restrain partner states to avoid war.[6] Bismarck’s Realpolitik was fundamentally relative, and therefore flexible—more so than Metternich’s balance of power—because all relevant information was considered in decision-making, and the value of such information was judged by how it contributed to the advancement of the state’s interests, instead of by how it related to “preconceived ideologies.”[7] Bismarck’s Realpolitik mitigated major, unnecessary war because of its narrow focus on national interests (as expressed in power terms). In unskilled hands, Realpolitik could produce the opposite result: naked pursuit of power with no consideration of systemic give and take. Hitler saw starting war with Western powers as a test of wills—superficially reminiscent of Bismarck’s ideas—but Hitler had to start war for personal reasons, whereas Bismarck practiced restraint based on realistic calculations of national interest.

Bismarck’s Realpolitik was complicated, required especially adept policymakers to function effectively, and required that policymakers share the same values toward the power system. Craig and George concluded flatly that a weakness of Bismarck’s (post-1871) system was its complicated structure.[8] Bismarck fashioned complicated policies that were difficult for successors to understand and follow.[9] Wilhelm II began early in his reign to undo Bismarck’s carefully crafted network of alliances in the name of simplifying German foreign policy, reassuring Austria their alliance was priority, and attempting to ally with Britain.[10] After Bismarck’s dismissal, the German government destroyed what remained of the Bismarckian system and seriously weakened the European international system in the process.[11] It was a weakness of Bismarck’s Realpolitik that it assumed policymakers would all arrive at the same power calculations given the same set of circumstances; Bismarck could not conceive of policymakers assessing interests very differently.[12] Bismarck’s Realpolitik was prone to weakness because it required careful balancing of multiple power dynamics and small changes in those dynamics might have correspondingly larger effects on the overall system because of multiple, interacting relationships.

Wilson’s concept of collective security was ideal (may be seen as a variety of liberalism) and rejected any notion of a balance of power. According to Morgenthau, political liberalism believed that a moral and rational international order based on universal principles is possible and desirable, and that the essential goodness of human nature can be translated into international relations.[13] Wilson’s collective security was rigid since for a state to be able to secure itself meant that no state could be threatened, and it presumed that collective security as security for all would be durable because each state had an interest in resisting aggression and not being the object of aggression.[14] Wilson’s views, based on the American value of personal freedom, saw democratic values as universally applicable, and he believed democracy could be effectively legislated and promoted internationally through powerful institutions.[15] Wilson believed in sweeping away what he judged to be an inferior, old world school of thinking about balances of power.[16] Wilson’s ideas were based on the belief that power politics necessarily lead to conflict and war.[17] Realpolitik accepted the world as it is; Wilsonianism imposed an order on the world. Where Bismarck rejected the idea of any preconceived ideologies driving international relations and national foreign policies, Wilson only conceived of international relations as an extension of moral values.

Wilson’s concept of collective security aspired to eliminate what he believed were the destructive drivers of conflict and war. Mueller’s argument laid out in “The Obsolescence of Major War,” that the long peace is the culmination of a long historical process of human realization that war is futile and morally repugnant, appears Wilsonian.[18] Wilsonianism was based on a belief that the causes of war can be—and should be—eradicated.[19] Wilson believed in stamping out national self-interest and other impulses that he believed prevented peace, but he was impatient with political compromise and accommodation and this proved disastrous in shaping the unstable interwar period.[20] Wilson’s idealism was echoed in Morgenthau’s assessment of Chamberlain: morally good motives based on desire for peace, yet his policies contributed to World War Two by facilitating Hitler’s accumulation of power.[21] Chamberlain pursued a course of “considerate politeness” in dealing with growing German military and economic power and it resulted in “disaster.”[22]

According to a realist viewpoint, Wilson’s ideal concept of collective security would invite aggression. Unlike Wilson, some view war as not a disease to be cured but as a basic part of the human condition. War creates a certain degree of understanding by imparting meaning to human endeavor, giving a higher purpose to suffering, and imposing a clear-cut order of events based on right and wrong.[23] For Robin Fox, war resides in human nature and not so much in the nature of human aggression.[24] A weakness of collective security is that interests are not uniformly appreciated by states (or “seamless”) and collective security can mask—not eliminate—sharply divergent interests.[25] An ideal concept, Wilson’s collective security did not account for what realist have argued will happen over time, that the drive to gain security advantage will upset collective agreements. For realists, in the face of uncertainty—such as Bismarck’s increasingly complex web of alliances—states will hedge against unforeseen future calamities or unwanted changes in the international system, which means they will stop acting perfectly rational and stop thinking in purely power terms. Wilson’s ideal view did not adequately account for uncertainty, fear, and the sort of deliberate manipulation and undermining of a leader like Hitler.

Kissinger celebrated Bismarck as a master statesman and criticized him at the same time (which is not necessarily contradictory). For Kissinger, Bismarck’s Germany was a faux-state since it was essentially a greater Prussia pursuing greater power.[26] Trachtenberg wrote that stability follows Realpolitik, and that policies that counter the rational pursuit of national interests can be harmful to international stability.[27] Bacevich argued that Wilsonianism was poor policy but what is especially dangerous in today’s American society is the trumped-up use of military force to advocate for and spread Wilsonian ideals.[28] Realpolitik and collective security, like the international relations theories they draw on, are tools which in the right hands and under the right geopolitical circumstances can help stabilize the international system for a time. But political relationships change, subsystems change in response to dominant power arrangements, challengers to stability will appear, and inflexible policy frameworks may fail because they do not adapt to changing relative power relations between states.

Are Realpolitik and collective security really different? Morgenthau explained that political realism accepts the worlds as it is, human nature as it is, and historic processes as they actually happen.[29] Bismarck rejected the idea of self-restraint based on shared conservative values.[30] For Wilson, to avoid the outbreak of war required a universal system of shared values. Returning to theories of political realism and liberalism, Realpolitik and collective security are fundamentally different because they are based on two very different conceptions of human nature, one essentially negative and one positive. Laid over these contrasting assumptions of human nature are differing views of war and its purpose. For authors like Robin Fox, war may have intrinsic, self-rewarding qualities, and may be a world historical constant.[31] But since war’s material destructiveness is undeniable, it is unlikely such acceptance of war’s inevitability will ever be universally accepted.

Bismarck saw national power relations flexibly and so applied Realpolitik flexibly. But practiced by less accomplished policymakers, Realpolitik can become dangerously inflexible. Wilsonian collective security was fundamentally inflexible but attempted to put international relations on a foundation of human morality. It should be noted that both foreign policy approaches require accurate intelligence about the national and international systems and this is not always forthcoming. Trying to ascertain exactly what is happening domestically and internationally is not always easy and intelligence can be manipulated or wrong, or simply not available. As well, the international system can always be undermined by leaders determined to bring about political change forcibly.


Notes

1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 8.

2. Ibid., 4.

3. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 104.

4. Ibid., 121.

5. Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 12.

6. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 170.

7. Ibid., 127.

8. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 34.

9. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 135.

10. Ibid., 178-79.

11. Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, 35.

12. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 127.

13. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3.

14. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 90.

15. Ibid., 84.

16. Trachtenberg, Cold War and After, 16.

17. Ibid., 3.

18. John Mueller, “The Obsolescence of Major War,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman Publishers, 2002), 20.

19. Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10.

20. Trachtenberg, Cold War and After, 16.

21. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6.

22. R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 343.

23. Chris Hedges, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 10.

24. Robin Fox, “Fatal Attraction: War and Human Nature,” National Interest 51 (Winter 1992-1993): 16.

25. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 90.

26. Ibid., 169.

27. Trachtenberg, Cold War and After, 14.

28. Bacevich, New American Militarism, 13-14.

29. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4.

30. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 104.

31. Fox, “Fatal Attraction,” 13.

Saturday, January 11, 2014

Discussion: Revisiting the World Wars

The world wars were essentially one long conflict due to German expansionism and the part played by unresolved issues over competing national interests, but with some important differences including the singular role of Hitler and the roles of the militaries in the run up to outbreak of hostilities. After considering some salient similarities and critical dissimilarities between the wars, this analysis will consider what these conflicts suggest about the causes of war and the conditions for stable peace.

German expansionism—what Kissinger referred to as German “revisionist impulses”—was a fundamental cause of war in 1914 and in 1939.[1] Such a vast and complicated historical event as the outbreak of world war will have both proximate causes and more fundamental causes, or what A.J.P. Taylor referred to as general causes and particular causes.[2] In World War One, as costs of war mounted Germany, as with other powers, expanded its war aims and thus made it more difficult to arrange war termination. By early 1915 Germany would not consider a settlement that forced it to surrender any territory it had already claimed by arms, and an early peace offer by Germany to Britain was rejected on the claim that the Allies must be secure from any future German aggression.[3] In World War Two, German expansionist aims included subjugating non-German populations and seizing historically non-German lands.[4] Before World War One, Crowe seemed to believe that Germany was on a collision course with Britain either because Germany desired to expand its power at the expense of the British, or because its behavior would in any case lead (no matter what the motives) to British response to rising German power—or conflict in either case.[5] In contrast, Trachtenberg considered the argument that Germany set out to contrive a general European war to be fairly “weak.”[6] In World War One German aims expanded (as did Allied war aims); in World War Two Hitler began with extremely ambitious aims to expand German territory and control over resources.

Both world wars resulted from a series of unresolved or poorly managed crises, including the Bosnian crisis of 1908, the Abyssinian crisis of 1935, and remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. The so-called Pig War and a wider economic struggle exacerbated tensions between Serbia and Austro-Hungary.[7] Shortsighted decisions made by leaders made each successive crisis harder to resolve than the earlier one.[8] Crowe referred to an “almost perpetual friction” between Germany and Britain caused by what he saw as aggressive German foreign policy.[9] On the road to war in 1914, the opposing alliances built distrust but failed to resolve growing suspicions of the other’s intent, and the alliances were not so much interested in avoiding war as maintaining their internal arrangements—confrontation was accepted as necessary.[10] In one example, Germany (a major power) was not above bribing Serbia (a much smaller power) to maintain its power alliances, coalitions, and blocs.[11] In 1913 Wilhelm II promised that Germany would come to Austria’s aid in future crises, and was prepared to “follow” Austria to war.[12] In the series of action-reaction cycles that led to war in 1914, Britain was in a good position to stop the progressive deterioration of diplomatic relations; though it had no significant interest in the Balkan crisis, it did have an interest in preserving the Triple Entente.[13] According to Kissinger, Russian military leaders objected to the Tsar’s political restraint, wanted war before Germany could complete mobilization, and in the end, the Tsar did not impose his will on his generals and ordered full mobilization on 30 July.[14] The London and Locarno settlements were partial attempts to correct the impasse created by an untenable Versailles Treaty, which failed to reintegrate Germany to the international order as a full entity, practically broke it economically, and politically isolated German leaders.[15] For Cohen, the 1930s was a period of outright and no-holds-bared economic warfare to presage World War Two.[16] A series of almost-wars led to Serbia and the July crisis that sparked World War One, while another series of crises against the backdrop of a punitive peace settlement, economic hardship, and social dislocation in Germany provided some of the circumstances that contributed to the 1939 invasion of Poland.

Political leaders on all sides appeared to misjudge the psychology of opposing leaders and misread the intentions and decision-making processes of other powers before both wars. Before World War One, it could be said that the Allied leaders failed to appreciate the national insecurity in Germany over the prospect of being “Europe’s main battlefield” again.[17] Hitler made numerous miscalculations of adversaries. Hitler miscalculated that he could have attacked Czechoslovakia and handed a fait accompli to the British and French.[18] Following his invasion of Poland, Hitler erred in judging British and French readiness to go to war; he believed they would not go to war but shortly found out they were not yet serious about fighting Germany.[19] Hitler was deliberately setting out to turn Poland into a general war and British-French decision making was only a prop. It does not appear that Wilhelm II set out to turn a Balkan conflict into a great power war.

World War One was caused in part by the desire of Wilhelm II that Germany receive what he deemed full recognition as a major power. In contrast, World War Two resulted in part from Hitler’s deliberate and carefully calculated war policy. Hitler had no intention of keeping his diplomatic promises and, according to Taylor, he celebrated his disregard for diplomatic norms.[20] Hitler deliberately used the prospect of peace initiatives to play on his adversaries’ wishes.[21] After consolidating power in 1934, Hitler turned his attention almost exclusively to foreign policy and rearmament.[22] Even though Hitler “probably intended” a major war to conquer the Soviet Union, the absence of a functioning international power system that precluded major war, after occupation of the Rhineland, made war more distinctly possible, but did not make it inevitable.[23] If World War One appeared to be a case of multiple leaders stumbling into war through inattention and careless diplomacy, World War Two appeared the deliberate project of an individual leader, Hitler. Not a blunder of misdirected policy, World War Two was the result of Hitler’s calculations.[24] History can never be fully divorced from contingency. World War Two did not have to follow the first conflict, but it did follow in part because of Hitler’s aims. The need for great power status and recognition that animated Wilhelm II can be contrasted with Hitler’s spurning of great power protocols and his deliberate war policy.

World War One erupted quickly once a local crisis in the Balkans had committed major powers which had overlapping great power interests in the region. A dispute over Bosnia and Serbia resulted in an invasion of Belgium, which obligated Britain to intervene in the war, in part because the unresolved crises leading up to 1914 reinforced two rigid and hostile alliances.[25] Based on what was essentially a terrorist act, European powers went to war within weeks and since Archduke Ferdinand’s wife was not royalty, no European crown royals attended the funeral where they could have met and worked out the issues in person.[26] France and Britain in the 1930s harbored distrust toward each other and failed to reasonably assess the threat of a growing Germany, and failed to agree on the importance of what to do about the most controversial elements of the Versailles Treaty (large parts of Britain’s political elite were anti-French).[27] Unlike the alliances leading to 1914, the alliances of the interwar period were especially dysfunctional. Because of diplomatic missteps, France found itself relying on a military alliance of states too weak to help and a “strategic dependence” on Britain which refused any defense commitment.[28] In World War One, smaller allies successfully dragged along major powers (e.g., Russia and Serbia); in World War Two, the major powers facing Germany vacillated significantly specifically to avoid being inadvertently committed to hostilities against their perceived interests.

The roles of the militaries before each conflict were different. Before World War One, all major European militaries constructed elaborate mobilization and war plans that drastically reduced the time that would be available during crises to find diplomatic solutions and avoid military conflict.[29] Once war appeared imminent in 1914, both Russian and German general staffs were reluctant to “scrap” decades of military planning and preparation.[30] By Kissinger’s account, the great power militaries were “spoiling” for war in 1914, then in 1939 there was some reluctance on the part of militaries to launch war.[31] France refused to mobilize before the Rhineland incident for fear of sparking hostilities.[32] According to Taylor, unlike the crowds that apparently cheered the arrival of war in 1914, apprehension gripped the German population during the Czech crisis of 1938.[33] War-weariness was still evident in many European populations in 1939.[34] German generals believed they were unprepared for war in 1939.[35] They were adamant rearmament had not progressed enough in 1938 to face Britain and France in war.[36] According to Kissinger, World War One resulted from a combination of “reckless” diplomacy and disregard for the potential of flashpoints to ignite general war.[37] If the charge of derelict diplomacy can be accepted, then World War Two was different. It was unrealistic and disjointed allied diplomacy that allowed Hitler to manipulate international relations for war.

Were the world wars one long conflict or distinct? Taylor argued World War Two was an outgrowth of World War One, linked by a poorly conceived and unstable Treaty of Versailles—it was a war between the three Western powers over the settlement of Versailles.[38] For Jeffrey Record, the idea of accommodating German demands to alter aspects of the Versailles Treaty was not without some logic and merit since the treaty was not entirely just or enforceable, and it was strategically myopic.[39] For Kissinger’s part, as long as Germany continued to rearm and increase its military power, it would be bound to upset the international order until stopped or countered.[40] Though there were similarities and dissimilarities, the similarities more directly link the two conflicts. Leaders like Hitler and Wilhelm II were of course very different individuals, but the European powers were dealing with the same geopolitical forces: the France and Germany rivalry, British interests vis-à-vis the continent, and German and Russian hostility.

Examining the conflicts for what they say about the causes of war and the conditions for stable peace, highlights the importance of diplomacy as an active undertaking requiring a understanding of state interests, policy motivations (including the impact of domestic politics), and common systemic causes of war. It is important to accommodate the rise and decline of powers because policymakers are constantly in a position of having to interpret threats and stability and through a dynamic international system—like looking through a maelstrom—the chances for errors are high. The conditions for stable peace are probably numerous, but included would be existence of international forums where national security concerns can be negotiated peacefully and foreign policymakers who understand that alliances, if not properly communicated, can be destabilizing if perceived as threatening to other states.


Notes

1. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 266.

2. See A.J.P. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 2nd ed. (New York: Fawcett Books, 1969), 102.

3. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 220.

4. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45.

5. Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the present state of British relations with France and Germany,” 1 January 1907, FO 371/257, reprinted in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. 3, eds. George Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1928), 418.

6. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 49.

7. Laurence Lafore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1971), 147.

8. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 201.

9. Crowe, “Memorandum,” 417.

10. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 194.

11. Lafore, The Long Fuse, 182.

12. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 200.

13. Ibid., 212.

14. Ibid., 215.

15. Patrick O. Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 604.

16. Benjamin Cohen, “A Brief History of International Monetary Relations,” in International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, eds. Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 241.

17. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 170.

18. Alan Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War,” Proceedings of the British Academy 53 (1967): 135.

19. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 278.

20. Ibid., 106.

21. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 292.

22. Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins,” 121.

23. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 103.

24. Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins,” 140.

25. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 194, 216.

26. Ibid., 209.

27. Jeffrey Record, The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 7.

28. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 297.

29. Ibid., 201.

30. Ibid., 216.

31. Ibid., 348.

32. Ibid., 303.

33. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 104.

34. Record, Specter of Munich, 13, 116.

35. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 105.

36. Bullock, “Hitler and the Origins,” 134.

37. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 200, 208-9.

38. Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 278.

39. Record, Specter of Munich, 116.

40. Kissinger, Diplomacy, 295.